



THE  SURFACE  VERB  ttREMIND,,  REVISIrliED







  It has caused  great progress in linguistic imry  that during these  several  years the  rapid
growth in generattvq semanties  (or abstract syntax) has raised  some  indisputable preblems
for interpretiye sernantios (br "the  standard theory") and  thereafter much  exoellent research
has been done from both viewpoints.
  This paper is an  attempt  to modify  sonwwhat  the theory proposed in Paul Postal (19-
71),1 in which･  he tried to introduce thc superfrieial  verb  "remind"  withn  the framework of
generative semantics.  For example,  Postal tries to gene[ate the supeificial  structure  of  (1)
from its underlying  semantic  represerrtation  of  (2).





   'pereelve
          s
A
    tw
Jackt(gl
     vr
vA .
                                          SIMILAR
                                                      ago
To derive, within the theroreticai framework proposed by Postal, the superfieial structure of
(1) frorn an  underlying  semantic  representation  like (2), SatbjectRaising must  be applied.at
first o tbe sul)ject NP "Jack';  in the embedded  sentence;  second,the  transformational rule
which  Postal ealls JPSych-movement  must  be applied  between the raised  NP  "Jack"  and  the
IO NP  of  the matrix  sentence,  i.e. "I";  third, the so-called Remind-Fbrmation rute3  must
occur  for remind  to appear  in･the surfaoe; and  fourth. we  must  apply  
"oflinsenion".
 The
output  structure ofthese  four prooesses equals  the surfaoe structure of  (1).
  The rnost  important assurnption  that Postal tries to malce  in his paper is the following.
For the shnhce structure to be derived we  must  apply  two  transformatiQnal rules  (viz.,
raising  and  Psych-nioveinent prior to the application  of  the  lexical insertion of  
"rernind".
Hence the pattern of  the staridard' theory in which  the prior application  of  lexical insertion
transformations, and  subsequent  application  of  non･lexical  transformational rules is an  a pn'-
ori  requirqmerit  can  no  longer obtain  in the  theory preserrted by Postal. That is to say, for a
grammatical theory to have explanatory  adequaqy,  it must  somehow  be able to explain  the
facts notioed  above.  To explain  these  facts q grafnmar must  generate at first semantic  strings
from a  semantically  based pomponent, and  next,  so-called grammatical transforrnations must
be applied  to the phrase markers  generated by the base ef  semantic  representation;  and  the
surface structure can  be regarded  only  as the superficial syntactic representation  of  the
 1 Paul M. Postal, 
"On
 the Surfaee Verb  `Remiad',"  Sicvadles in Linguistic Setnantibs, edited  by  C. J.
Fillmere &  D, T. IaiigendoeT! (New York  : Helt, Rinchart &  Winston, 1971}.
2 Ibld,p.18S.
 3 For 
"Remind-Fonriation"
 to be  applicable,  predkztc  mising  rnust  have been formerly applied  to the
embedded  absuact sernantic  pri:nide [SIMILAR] as  a  necessary  condition  for the appliaibility of
`'RernindFormation".
 It goes without saying  that Pbstal seerpts  McCawley's analysis  of ptecliute raising
and  that he fiarther develeped McCawley's theary. See J. D. McCawtey, "LeFical  Insertion in a  Itaiisfor-
mational  Grarnmar Without Deep  Structure," Giuvmuv. and  Mbaning  Crokyo: Taishukan Publishing





underlying  semantic  representation. At preseirt we  shall  aocept  the theoretical framework of
generative sernantios. Whether  or  not  the theoretical implications of  generatiye semantios
are valid shall be discussed elsewhere.4
   To return  to our  main  topic, I wM  demonstrate that Postal's propesa1 for the  introduc-
tion Qf  the surface  verb  
"rernind"
 from an  underlying  representation  like (2) seems  to be
inadequate in several  ways.  As  Postal himseif puts it :
   Let us  consider now  the meaning  of  remind.  It seems  to invotve conceptually  a percep-
tion of sirnilarity between two  entities, one  represented  by the S NP, the other  O NP. The IO
NP then represents the entity  which  precetves the similarity.5
  This observation  may  be, in general, valid.  However, this is not  aiways  the case, sirice we
have many  examples  in which  the subject NP and  the object  NP do not  have a  similarity  re-
lation between  them  in the embedded  sentence.  For instance, consider  the following exarn-
ples,
  (3) 77zis picture always rerninds  rne  of  nry  deed brother:
  (4) Stich a  red  hat always  reminds  me  of  Betty Brown.
  (5) 7his chanswn  reminded  BM  ofhis  nattve  landL
  (6) ?ily mother  reminds  my  father of  those wild  animals  he brought home.
It is obvious  enough  that these exarnples  carmot  be derived from the theoretical apparatus
proposed by Postal. [[herefore some  other  kind of  possible underlying  structure skowing a
plausible semantic  representation  of  
"rernind"
 rnust  somehow  be established, one  that can
handle not  only  Postal's examples  but also  our  examples  (3) - (6).
   My  answer  responding  to the claim  rnade  in the imrnediately preceding paragraph is to
generate the surfaee  verb  
"remind"
 from some  kind of  causative  structure.6 For example,  we
may  offbr  a tentative analysis  
'that,
 for instance, something  lilce the fbll6wing structure  is
the underlying  semantic  representation  of  (1) instead of  (2), which  Postal assumes  to be
plausible as the semantic  representation.
 4 George Lakoff  tries to justify gonerative semantics,  giving the 
"dissuade-persuade
 net"  argument  in
which  he attempts  to yalidatc  a  theary of  lexical insertion witheut  deep structure. As  his analysls  shows.
"dissuade"  must  be derived from "persuade  not"  siriee  '`dissuade"  behaves syntactically  more  like 
"per-
suade  not"  than 
"net
 pe[suade". Georgt Lakoff, 
"On
 Deriyational Constraints," flrpers F}om  the ayth
Reg]ional Mleeting, Chiaagv Linguistt`c Society, ed. Robert I. Biiminck etal  (Chicago: Departrnent of  Lin-
guistios, Universlty of Chicago, 1969), and  George  Lakoff, 
"On
 Generative Semanties," Setnantit s, ed.
D. D. Steinberg and  L. A. Jakobovits (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1971).
5 Postal,op et't., p. 184.
 6 The  argurnent  which  derived 
"lcil1"
 from [CAUSE to die] is a  farniliar one.  In fbotnote 4 I have re-
ferred to a similar analysis  by  G. Lakoff  where  he tries to derive 
"dissuade"
 frorn [persuade notl.  Yer
Lakoff's analysls  seems  to be somewhat  defieient, sinoe  the Lexical itein 
"persuade"
 itseif can  be de-
composed  into [CAUSE to believe (or recognizej]  . Of  course  it seems  to be correct  for Lakoffto  try to
derive "dissuade"  from  fpersuade notl  , for his analysis  obviousty  foilows the general rnethod  where  the
pattern with decomposed  semmtic  primtttves is preserved. If the above  argument  is conect,  Georgia M,
Green's argurnent  (1969) seems  te be  comparatlvely  valid. As  her insightful paper shows, we  must  net
search  for the relation  among  icxical items, but rather  we  abould search  for it among  lexical entries. Fog
as  e]uarnptes such  as 
'`Icil1
 vs. die". `'send,  vs. go" show, it is the' case  that lexical items do not  neeessarilly
invotve sorne  overt  and  common  morpholegical  relatedness  arnong  thern. Rather it seems  intuitively
correct  that we  sl)euld 1ook foT the  relabedness  among  lexical entries. Tlierefore our  analysis  of  
"remind"
that it must  be demi  from  the  underlying  [CAUSE to remember]  seems  to have a  rncrtivated ground.
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This approach  seems  to be superior  to Postal's in that  it does not  require  a condition  that
the gubject NP  and  the object  NP  ofthe  embedded  sentenoe  of(2)  (that is, the subject  of  the
matrix  sentence  and  the object  NP  of  the embedded  sentence  of(7)  ) must  have some  simi-
1arity; no  simi1arity relation exists in the structure of  (7), as we  have obseryed  above.  becond,
it is clear from the structure of  (7) that, since  this is the underlying  semantic  representation
itself, Psych-rnovement transformation which  Postal's theory necessitates is obviously  unnee
essary in the derivational history of  (7) to the surface. All the examples  can  be phonetically
realized  without undergoing  the lexicalization tra sformation replacing the'underlying string
"CAUSE
 to REMEMBER"  by the actual surface verb  
"remind".
 We  have
'
 (8) Jack causes  me  to remember  a  gorilla. .
    (9) This picture always causes  me  to remember  my  dead brother.
    (10) Such a  red  hat always  causes  me  to Temember  Betty Brown.
    (1 1) This clmson  caused  BM  to remember  his native 1and.
    (12) My  rnother  causes  my  father to remember  those wild  anirnals  he brought home.
[[hese sentenoes  are  all good  and  welhformed.
  A  third problem  in Postal's theory is in his e4planation  of  the derivation of  (42-d)
frorn (42-oj at the last stage  of  which  he inserts the  preposition "of'  into tlre dertved phrase-
marker.7  Hewever, we  have no  plausible motiyation  for the insertion of  this 
"ofi',
 since
there seems  to be no  guarantee for its existence  in the underlying  semantic  representation.
Yet the appeararice  of  "oP'  at this level is easily  accounted  for in our  formulation, since the
ptepositien in question is already  present in the underlying  semantic  representation  of(7)･8
  A  fourth deficient argument  in his theory is one  conceming  the distribution of  reflexive
pronouns. Ms  examp!es9  are:
7 Pestal,op,cit,pp,192-193.
 8 Tlie fact that the preposition 
"of'
 docs  iH}t  appear  in the surfaee  structures of(8)-(12)  seerns to be
countdrexample  against our  formulation. Hcrverer, there'is a  good  reason  to claim that 
"of'
 may  be de-
leted in the  dertsrational history of  (8}-<12) te their surfaee  structures FoT, in some  cases,  we  have a  form
`lremember






  (13) a  "Harry  reminds  me  of  himselfl
       b 'Johnson  reminds  Betty of  himself.
To rule  out  these ungrammatical  sentences,  Postal presents a noncoreference  constraint
between the embedded  subject NP and  the embedded  object  NP  in his underlying  semantic
structute (2). Postal tries te justifY.his analysis by stating  as  follows:
  The  natural sugggstion  at this point is that one  can  explain  the S-O constraint in sen-
tences  with  the surface verb  remind  if they are  derived from underlying  structures  containing
erribedded  sentential  structures with  those prvperties that are  common  to sentences  1iker20I
This assumes  that the coreferenoe  block in such  sentences  is attributed  to some  set of
syntactic-semantic  features common  to predicates like similar,  resembie,  tike. 1O
However, his deduction in this analysis is mistaken  in itsel£  It shortly  becomes clear  that this
constraint  is no  longer necessary  or is even  incorrect if we  could  derive sentences  with
"remind"
 from the underlying  structure  like (7) instead of  (2). For example,  we  have
  (14) .laek  causes  Betty to remember  him.
The underlined  nouns  can  be coreferential. 11 The grammaticality of  this kind ofsentence
becomes even  more  explicit  in the following three  examples.
  (1S) laek causes  Betty to remember  him  by writing  a  long love letter to her.
  (l6) Jbck  causes  Betty to remember  him  with  his usualjokes.
  (17) .lack causes  Betty to remember  him by showing  many  photograpbs of  her.
If we  suppose  that the underlying  semantic  representation  of  (14) is given in (18), there
seems  to be no  doubt for the second  underlined  norninal's  not  changing  into a reflexive
pronoun,  since the two  coreferents  do not  nieet the condition  ofreflexivization:  they are
not  
"clause
 mates".  .
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With  an  underlying  semantic  representation  1ike (18), and  the condition  of  pronominaliza-
tion  being met,  we  have no  possibdity to transform the second  underlined  Jack into a  refiex-
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10 thldL,p.186.
11 Tlromas G. Dieterich, "Causative  Hin,e," fupers 147om the Eleventh Rqglonal Mleetirig, Chiargo
Linguistic sect'ety, ed. Robin  E. Grossman  et ai (Chicago: Department  of  Linguistics, Universlty of
Chicago, 1975), p. 170. He claims as  follows:
   Reflexive distribution also psovides evidenoes  for a  sentential-complemerrt  wirh  raised subject  NP.
   In (36) .lohn  and  the object  of  ]?v do net  occur  in the same  simplex  sentence,  (compare (37a, b),
   where  they do  ):
          (36) John has forty serfs werking  for hirn 1 'himseif.
          <37) a.  JQhn  bought  a  car  for hirn. him  t hirnself.





ive pronoun. Tlius we  may  claim that the argument  concerning  the phenomena Postal
presents to jiistifY his theory analysing  the uriderlying embedded  clause  as  a "simi1arity  pre･
dicate" is in fact fa11aeious. It is certain that ungrarnrnatical sentences･  such  as  (13a, b) can
never  be derived from the underlying  sermantic  structure our  theory presents.
  On  the contrary,  the noncoreferenee  constraint, that Postal assumes  to be necessary
between the subje¢ t and  the object  in the embedded  sentence  of  the underlying  semantic
structure  of  (2), seems  to obtain  between the subject and  the object  in the embedded  sen-
tenoe  of  our  underlying  semantic  structure in (7).12 That is, we  have no  such  spntenoes as
are given below: ･
  (19) 
"Jack
 reminds  me  of  ay"elf
  (20) 'Jack  causes  me  to remember  no,self
  (21) Jack eauses me  to be [?".E&Ige,iS,oe"t] of  nu,self
  (22) 'Betty  causes  Jim  to  remember  himseij
Thus  the ungrarnmaticalky  of  these exarnples  can  be perfectly explained  by the above  cori-
stramt.
  Following Andy  Rogers,14 we  may  assurne  that the 
"remind"
 construction  has two
possible semantic  interpretations. One of  thern is the stative  reading  of  
"remind".
 And  the
other  ene  is the active reading  of  it. For example,  the  following two  serrtences show  this
fact.
  (23) Jack iuadvertently reminds  me  of  his dead brother.
  (24) Jack intentionally reminds  me  of  his dead brother.
With sorne  kinds of  adverbials, the "remind"  construction  can  be interpreted in different
ways.15  Another knd  of  distinction between (23) and  (24) is the  one  ofthe  "intentional  vs.
non4ntentional"  readings  of  
"remind".
 In (23) Jack has no  intention to cause  me  to remern-
bgr his dead brother, and  it is a  mere  accident  that I remembered  him by, for instanoe, my
talking with  Jack about  something  that could  be a cause  of  my  recollecting  hirn; whereas,
12 lbld., see p. 169. The fact that 
`'post-iim,e
 expressions  display se1eetional  restrictions  between NP2
(the underlying  subject  of  the  embedded  sentenoe)  and  elgrnents  of  the  following expression"  seems  to
offer  an  indirect support  to our  argument  coneerning  the  distribution of  reflexive  pronouns.
13 The  gramrnaticality of  a  sentence  oontaining  "aware"  seems  to be sornewhat  fuzzy.
14  Andy  Rogers, 
"Another
 LoQk  at  Flip Pereeption Verbs," Ilapers F}om  theEighth RegionalMleettrrg;
Chicago Lirrguistic Society. .ed. Pqul M. Ptmnteau et aL  (Chicago: Department of  Linguistics, University
of  Chicago, 1972).
15 We  can  show  thg stattve versus  nanstative  distinction by 1ookipg at the.following mmples
   STATIVE  [casually, 'intentionally]  see. heart





in (24) he has an  obvieus  intention to do so.  This fact has often  been noticed  by linguists.1 6
Now  let us  conslder  sorne  more  examples  to rnake  this point clear.
  (25) Jack Tefninds  me  of  his French nieoe by showing  rne several photograpks of  her.
  (26) Jack's showing me  several  photograpks of  her reminds  me  of  his French nieoe.
While (25) can  give us  two  possible interpretations, an  
"intentional"
 reading  arid an  
"unin-
tentional" one,  (26) gives us  only  an  "unintentional"  reading.1  7
  Rogers gives an  insightfu1 observatjon:  
"both
 Flips and  Cognitives are  stative2'1  8 Suppose
that this claim is valid and  correct. Now  let us  make  a re-inspection  of  the theory of  "re-
mind"  Postal presents: according  to his analysis  the verb  
"remind"
 must  be derived from an
underlying  representation  like [STRIKE-LIKE (or SIMILAR)] and  the underlying  abstract
verb  [STRIKE] must  undergo  the subject-object inversion (Flip). We  must  analyse  this claim
in the light of  Rogers' above  observation.  Sinoe the verb  "rernind"  is a Flip verb  according  to
Postal, then the verb  "remind"  must  be stative, yet this is not  necessarily the case as  we  have
observed  above  in our  analysis of  (25).19 This fact is obviously  contradictory  to PQstal's
analysis of  
"rernind".
  Now  we  have considered  what  the underlying  semantic  representation  ofthe  surfhoe verb
"rernind"
 should  be 1ike and  at least made  it clear that the analysis  ofthe  underlying  seman-
tic representation  assumed  by Postal is not  correct. And  we  have shown  some  pieoes of
evidence  for the assumption  that we  sbould  derive the verb  under  consideration  from some
kind of  underlying  causative  construction.  Notice, however, that the structure  that we  have
16 David Dowty,  "On  the Syntax and  Semmtics ef  the Atomic  Predicate CAUSE,"  lhpers Fft)m the
Eighth Rcgional ?lfeetbrg; C7iiaqgo Lingta`stic Sbciety, p. 66. He  justifies Ross' analysis  in which  Ross
assumes  a higher verb  "dQ"  must  be present in a  sentenoe  whicli  gives an  intentional reading.  For example,
Dowty  ghres two  different underlying  semantic  structures,  as follows:
(a)
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Of the  above  stnictuies,  (a) has an  intentional reading,  whereas  (b) has an  unint ¢ ntional  one.
17 Paul Kiparsky &  Carol Kiparsky, "Fact,"  Semantit s; p. 346. There seems  to be sorne  relation  be-
tween  
"factivity"
 and  
`'unintentienality".
 According to Kiparslcy and  Kipaisky, 
"only
 factive" predicates
allow the ful1 range  of  gorundial constructions.  Henoe it isquite natural  that (26) gives only  an  
"uninten-
tional" reading,  sinee  "Jchn's  sihowing rne several photegraphs ef  her" is a  single fact. Probably no  one
would  clairn that a fact can  have an  intentien.
18 Andy  Rogt  rs, op  citL, p. 306.
19 David Dowty,  op. (ntL, p. 72, footnote 9. In this fbot!Krte Dewty  ofEers  a  quite interesting obsema-
tion. For example,  if our  example  (25) has a pronomltza1 form before the gerundial construction,  it can
give us  only  an  irrtenti[)nal rea(ii[ig.  11iat is,
   (25) Jaelc raninds  me  of  his French  nieee by his showing  me  several  photographs of  her.
Most mative  speakers  probably recognize  only  an  intenticma1 reading  in (25). The deletion of  the pro-
norninal  fbrrn his can  be exp!ained  by Super-Equi N?  deletion. Super-Equi NP detetion is a  rule  tltat can
delete an  ldentical NP  in the S node  not  imrnediatety dotninated by the highest S. For exatnple,  in the fa)
example  of  our  fbotnote 16, the "X"  in the S2 can  be deleted by ldentity with  the `'X"  in the So. On  the





supposed  to be valid as the underlying  semantic  representation  was  tentative and  that it
seems  to be invalid in some  respects.  The  most  problematic aspect  in the  structure of  (7) is
the fact that it cannot  show  the connotation  ef  cognition  that should be involyed in the
presupposed semantic  content  of  the verb  
"rembd".
 Hence, to integrate this semantic  fact,
we  should  modify  the underlying  structure of(7)  into somethng  like (27).2O
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The verb  "remind"  seems  to presuppose the following: for someone  to remember  something,
he must  perceixe somethng  the recognition  of  which  becomes the cause  for his second  or
imer activity,  that is, "remembering  something."
  A  pieoe of  evidence  that can  validate  this analysis  is the fact thatasentence such  as(1),
"Jack




Jack" on  the part of  
"me".
 Therefore, to show  this presupposed psychological cognition,  we
must  soipehow  integrate this implication i to the underlying  sernantic representation  if our
grammatica1 theory is to be adequate.21  As the resuit ofthis  analysis, (27) is a plausible and
feasible candidate  for the underlying  semantic  representation  of  the "remind"  construction.
Moreover, (27) is explicit enough  to sbow  that the "remind"  construction  must  be derived
from a structure with  two underlying  sentential complements,  one  of  which  is the cause  of
some  subsequent  activity  or  perforrnance and  the other  of  which  is, therefore, the effect
occasioned  by the cause.
  Another piece of  evidence  for our  analysis  is the fact that serrtence  (28) with  "remhd"
can  be paraphrased into both (29) and  (30).22
  (28) Jack rerninds-  me  of  his French niece by showing me  several  photograpbs of  her.
  (29) WhenIsee several photograpks of  her,Iremernber Jack's French niece.
  (30) Tlie fact of  Jack's showing  me  several photograpbs of  her reminds  me  ofhis  French
       niece.
The verb  "see",  which  is clearly  cognitive,  appears  in (29). And  if, in (30), John's sh(]wirrg
me  several  photographs of  her (his French nieoe) is a  fact, then my  seeing those photograpbs
is also a fact. It follows from these conslderations  that the construction  with the surface  verb
"remind"
 should be derived from an  underlying  sernantic representation  with  two  sentential
complements,  that these two  cornplements  have a re1ationship  of  cause  and  effect, and  that
20 D. Dowty,  op  cit., p. 62. Dowty suggests  as  follomst 
"...the
 atomic  predicate CAUSE  irrvariably
takes a sententia1  subiect  rather  than an  individual." Agreeing to  his ldea. we  rnay  modify  the underlying
structure  of  the `ltemind"  construction  as we  show in the structure of  (27).
21 Andy  Rogers, op.  cit., p, 306. We  may  agree  to Rogers'observation: `' . . . ?ostal's P ych-Movement
analysis  shoukl  be replaoed,  if possible, by one  which  clairrts hst  sentenoes  with Flip perception verbs  pTe-
suppose  corresponding  sentenees  with Cognitive verbs."
22 David Dowty, op. cit, p.63. To  eite his words,  
"A
 za tssLtive sentenoe  with  a NP subject  and  a by-





the supposed  temporal relationship  between the two  cornplements  can  be made  clear by the
paraphrase into a sentence  with  such  cenjuncttons  as  u,hen,  dier, etc.  The  paraphrasability
of  the 
"remind"
 construction  into a construction  with coajunctions  denoting a  temporal re-
1ation seems  to validate  our  assurnption  that the "rernind"  construction  should  be derived
from an underlying  semantic  structure that invoives two  sentential  complements.
SUMMARY
  We  have argued  that the surface  verb  
"rernind"
 should be derived from some  knd  of
underlying  causative construction.  And  that  underlying  structure shoul,d contain  two  senten-
tial complements  (arguments) the relationship  between which  can  be captured  as thqt of
cause  and  efTect.23  Postal (1971) is surely  insightfu1 in that it has made  it clear that we
should dertve some  v'erbs, which  seem  to have no  corresponding  underlying  forms, from
oertain  structures which  are  composed  of  
"atomic
 predicates". So fhr so  goed. Yet his par-
ticular derivation has obvious  mistakes, which  we  have discussed in this paper. To end  up
this discussion, we  wM  here present a short summary  of  our  findings concerning  the con-
struction  underlying  the surfaoe verb  "remind".
  (A) Postal's claim  that 
"remind"
 should be derived from something  like [STRIKE LIKE
     (or SMIIAR)]  is not  vabd.
  (B) Our analysis,  in which  the "remind"  construction  should be deriyed from some  kmd
     of  underlying  causative  construction,  does not  necessitate  the so£ alled Psych-move-
     ment  that Postal's theory caimot  do without.
  (C) in Postal's analysis we  cannot  manifest  the temporal relationship  inherent in the
     connotatiens  of  
"remind".
 Our  theory,  however, can  show  this skade ofthe  meaning
     of  
"remind"
 by our  selection of  a  derivation in which  we  assume  two  underlying  sen:
     tential complements  which  imply a  causeeffect  relationship.
  (D) Postal's theory is inadequate in that the ambiguity  of  the "remind"  construction  in
     some  environments  cannot  be captured  in his theory. However, our  theory can  ex･
     plain this ambiguity  without  any  difficulty.
IMPLICATIONS
  What Postal tries to make  clear  in his paper is, along with  overt  or  implied suggestions  by
many  generative semarnticists  such  as G. Lakoff, J. D. McCawley, Georgia M. Green, etc.,24
that the standard  theory  is not  valid  in several'  respects. Of course,  the most  stimulating
problem  raised  by generative sernanticists  is the one  concerning  the validity  of the deep
structuie level. lnterpretive semanticists  assume  that so-called lexical items must  be inserted
prior te the derivation of  the deep structure. Hence  the deep structure has another  narne,
`ithe
 post4exical" structure-a term  somewhat  "defiant"  toward generative semantieists.
Generative semanticists  assume  that the base component  of  a grammar must  be given, in
terms of  semantic  representation.  Eheir theory is clearly  contradictory  to that of the inter-
pretive semantieists,  who  claim the precedence of  a  syptactically-based  gramrnar over  one
based on  semantics.
  It seems  to 
'be
 a correct analysis  that many  transitive verbs  can  be derived from ari ab-
23 Psychologically speaking, the cause  Should be thought ef  asacognition  of  something  on  the part of
the IO and  the effect may  be regarded  as his subsequent  menta1jedgment  about  the "something"  and  the
particular coupterpart  in question.
24 I am  not  saying  that the 1inguistic theories and  methods  by these linguists are quite the  same..but
that their theories Qvertly  throw  doubt  on  the claim of  the existence  of  the deep structure levet, disctiss-
ing the feasibfity of  icxical insertion transfbrmations after  the derivation of  the so-called '`deep  struo-






stract causative  verb  plus the intransitive counterparts  ofthese  verbs,  corrtaining the same･
semantic  primitives. McCawley's  
"Kill
 vs. CAUSE  to die" argument  is now  quite familiar
among  generative grammarians. As McCawley and  Postal claim, the recognttion  of  the level
of  the deep structure obviously  makes  it impossible to give a  uqary  treatment for, say,
"persuade
 vs. CAUSE  to believe", "dissuade  vs. persuade NOT",  
"enlarge
 vs. CAUSE  to
become 1arge", etc., in some  related  manner;  though, of  course  it is intuitively clear that
these pairs have somethng  in common.  As we  have observed  in footnote 6, we  somehow
have to find a way  to show  the relation we  have notioed  above.  Gteen's idea25 seems  to me
theoretically feasiblc apd intuitively correct.  Following her assumption,  we  rnust  diseuss the
relatedness  arnong  abstract  lexical entries,  rather  than the relatedness  observed  in less ah-
stract lexical iterns. Notice that we  do not  claim  that some  morphologicaUy  determined sur-
faoe forms must  necessarily  be present in natural languages. This is another  matter.26  We
are  nbw  talking of  how  we  should treat such  an  intuitiyely-perceived relatedness among





  Sinoe we,  along with  Green, have assumed  that we  should find out  some  relation  among
lexical entries, we  must  make  clear the reason  of  our  preferenoe of  this assumption  over
other  alternatives. If we  assume  that some  lexical items are regarded  only  as superficial re-
presentations which  are  the result  of  some  prooess such  as, shall we  say, 
"lexical
 item for-
mations"  from a  complex  of  several  underlying  primittves, the  number  of  lexical entries  in
the lexicon of  a  language naturally  deereases. If the hypothesis that  the relatedness  among
lexical items should be considered  as  the natural  result  of  the relations  among  lexical entries
is correct, then we  ¢ an  formalize the relation,  for instarioe, between  "Kil1  vs, CAUSE  to die",
which  has been intuitively noticed,  by using  the notion  of  "semantic  prmitives'i and  charac-
terizing the nature  of  their connection  in the underlying  semantic  representation.  [Ehusthe
theory of  semanticallybased  grammar seerns to be superior  to the theory of  nonsernanti-
cally-based  grarnmar in that it can  make  clear  the following fact. That is, some  intuitively re-
cognized  correlations  between many  pairs of  lexical items can  be fbrmalized into sDme
general fbrmat by the introduction f  the notion  of  lexical decompositon  and  the internal
connectedness  arnong  such"decomposed"  semantic  primitives.
  The  fact that many  transitive ve.rbs can  be 
"decomposed"
 into the pattern [CAUSE to
intr. v.] seems  to fit the theory of  generative grarnmar. Just as  eyery  sentenQe  can  be 
"de-
composed"  into' some  syntactic  pattern, every  lexical verb,  including  those  derived 
'from
causatives, inchoatives, etc., seems  also  to be structured  into such  "decomposed"  patterns.
Again, ifwe  can  give a sirnilar analysis to other  kinds of  lexical iterns, we  can  probably deduce
some  generai princicples governing the lexical structures of  not  only  English but also every
other  language. Furtherrnore, it seems  to be muclt  more  significant that the existence  of
such  principles can  presumably enable  us  to  shed light on  the  problem of  how  men  can
memorize  such  a stupendous  number  oflexical  iterns.
25 GeoTgia M. Green, op. cit,  pp. 78-79. According te her ldea: "1  conceive  of  the lexicon as  conslsting
of  a  largo set  of  distinct derived semantic  trees, a  mueli  srrtaller set  of  underlying  phonolegical forms with
specification  of  their morphological  idiosyneraeies (suppletions. truly  irregular inflections), and  some
mechanism(s)  relating  them. The  trees I wM  refer to as lexical entries, the phonological forms  with  indi-
cation  of  morphologica1  properties, as lexica1 items."
26 The  morphological  form  "kM"  remains  in present-day Englisk only  as an  aceidentalresult  of  the his-
toTical development of  the Enghsh laiiguage. Of  course, it malces  no  difference to suppose  that  we  have
sueh  an  imaginary vefb  "endie"  instead of  '`kill".  For instanoe, in Cahuilla (a subgroup,  which  is an  Uto-
Aztecan language spoken  in the  southern  part of  Califomia), mek  rneans  
"die"
 in English and  mek-ni  can
mean  both  
"kM"
 and  
"cause
 to die" in Enghsh. Thoug!i RA.  Jacobs giyes a  somewhat  different line of
analysis  to these examples,  we  may  iefer  to his paper. R. A. Jacobs, 
"Syntactic
 Compressien and  Sernan-
tic Change," Popers F7om  the IVinth Regtonal Mleeting; ChictTgo Linguistic Sbciety. ed.  Claudia Corum et
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